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A SIMPLE COMPROMISE: THE NEED FOR
A FEDERAL DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION
LAW
JACQUELINE MAY TOM†
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the credit information of approximately 163,000
consumers was stolen from ChoicePoint, now a division of
LexisNexis.1 ChoicePoint sold the information to identity thieves
impersonating business people.2 The thieves opened ChoicePoint
accounts by posing as debt collectors and insurance agents,
giving them access to a large database with records on almost
every individual in the United States.3 In response, the company
sent out notification letters, informing consumers that their
personal information may have been compromised.4 Ultimately,

†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Boston University.
1
Christopher Danzig, Mary Swanton & Lauren Williamson, Breach Patrol,
INSIDE COUNSEL, May 2009, at 60.
2
Id.
3
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., ID Data Conned from Firm: ChoicePoint Case Points to
Huge Fraud, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, at E01.
4
The following is an excerpt from one of the letters:
I’m writing to inform you of a recent crime committed against ChoicePoint
that MAY have resulted in your name, address, and Social Security number
being viewed by businesses that are not allowed access to such information.
We have reason to believe your personal information may have been
obtained by unauthorized third parties, and we deeply regret any
inconvenience this event may cause you.
....
We believe that several individuals, posing as legitimate business
customers, recently committed fraud by claiming to have a lawful purpose
for accessing information about individuals, when in fact, they did not.
When the fraud was discovered, access to information was discontinued
and the authorities were notified.
....
We have set up a toll free number to accept calls from our customers with
questions and to provide any additional advice and support we can. To
speak to someone about the information in this letter, please call 1-877[number redacted] between the hours of 6 a.m. and 7:30 p.m. Pacific time,
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more than 800 cases of identity theft were connected to the
incident, leading ChoicePoint to agree to a $15,000,000
settlement.5 Since 2005, many states have enacted data breach
notification laws covering when and how businesses that license,
own, or maintain computerized data must notify individuals
whose personal information has been breached. To date, forty-six
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands have enacted data breach notification laws.6 Only four
states—Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota—do
not have a data breach notification law.7
Because
many
states
have
different
notification
requirements, businesses involved in interstate commerce and
their in-house counsel are faced with a compliance nightmare.
They must constantly keep abreast of any amendments to state
laws that will affect their current practices and policies. This is
an extremely difficult task given that data breach notification
laws vary from state to state. Variations are so numerous that it
is virtually impossible to convert these state laws into the more
manageable format of fifty-state surveys.8
Some surveys
oversimplify the law, ignoring subtle differences,9 while others
are too detailed for practical use.10 In most cases, looking up
each of the forty-five statutes one by one is the only way to fully
understand the differences. Such diligence requires a lot of time
and effort.
Monday through Friday. We hope this information is helpful to you and
regret any inconvenience this may cause you.
Sincerely,
J. Michael De Janes, Chief Privacy Officer
ChoicePoint’s Letter to Consumers Whose Information Was Compromised, CSO
ONLINE, http://www.csoonline.com/article/221489/ChoicePoint-s-Letter-to-Consume
rs-Whose-Information-Was-Compromised (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
5
Danzig et al., supra note 1, at 60–61.
6
A list of the statutes and links to them can be found on the National
Conference of State Legislatures website, which periodically updates its list as new
statutes are passed. Security Breach Legislation 2010, NAT’L CONFERENCE ON STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20100 (last updated Oct. 12,
2010).
7
See id.
8
See infra Part I.
9
See, e.g., SCOTT & SCOTT LLP, STATE DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (Sept.
21, 2007), available at http://www.scottandscottllp.com/resources/state_data_breach_
notification_law.pdf (breaking down each state’s law into six factors).
10
See, e.g., PERKINS COIE, SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION CHART (June 24,
2008), available at http://www.digestiblelaw.com/files/upload/securitybreach.pdf
(describing the major elements of each state’s law).
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Once businesses understand the law, they must then decide
how to notify affected consumers. This decision is difficult.
Businesses that decide to comply with the law will find that in
certain situations, some states require notification, while others
do not. One option is to send one form letter complying with all
the state statutes. If a business sends this form letter to every
consumer who may have been affected, it could reduce its costs in
the short-term. But this method could also lead to increased
reputational harm because the business is choosing to notify
more individuals than required by state law. Many of these
individuals, having lost confidence in the particular business,
may decide to take their business elsewhere. A second option is
to send letters only to consumers residing in those states
requiring notification. Assuming that a business knows where
each of its customers resides, this option also reduces costs.
However, it treats consumers from different states unequally and
may be perceived as unfair. A third option is to send out
personalized letters. This option is the most costly, but may
preserve the most customer loyalty. Choosing between these
three options requires a thorough assessment of the severity of
the breach, the tenor of current customer opinion, and the costs
of sending notification. Businesses that decide not to comply
with the law are usually given a much simpler choice than their
law-abiding counterparts. Most decide that preserving their
reputation is more important than complying with the law; thus,
they never notify affected consumers.11
This is especially
alarming in cases where it is difficult to trace the breach back to
the records of a particular business.12 In such cases, it is
impossible to hold the business liable, so consumers remain
unaware that their identities are at risk.
The fact that a federal law would simplify matters has not
gone unnoticed. The 109th Congress was extremely active in
trying to get a federal law passed. “At the close of 2005, there
were at least seven House and Senate committees working on
11
This phenomenon is referred to in one paper as the “disclosure disincentive.”
Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, Anonymous Disclosure of Security Breaches:
Mitigating Harm and Facilitating Coordinated Response, in SECURING PRIVACY IN
THE INTERNET AGE 223, 234 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008). According to this
theory, businesses will decide not to disclose in two instances. Id. The first is when
they do not want to harm their reputation, and the second is when it is impossible to
trace the breach back to them. Id.
12
See id.
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federal legislation directly addressing what organizations should
do when individuals’ personal and private data has been illegally
accessed.”13 However, “all of the bills were mired down in
committees by turf wars and intense lobbying.”14 None became
law. The 110th Congress took steps to pass a bill, but it, too, was
unable to succeed.15 There was also activity in the 111th
Congress. Among the bills circulating were the Data Breach
Notification Act (S. 139),16 the Personal Data Security and
Privacy Act (S. 1490),17 the Data Security Act of 2010 (S. 3579),18
the Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2010 (S. 3742),19
and the Data Accountability and Trust Act (H.R. 2221).20 S. 139,
S. 1490, and H.R. 2221 were all approved by their respective
committees in the House and Senate. The House passed H.R.
2221 in December 2009. S. 3579 and S. 3742 were introduced
most recently in the summer of 2010. None of these bills became
law.
Despite all this congressional activity, whether the 112th
Congress will pass a federal data breach notification law remains
uncertain. Similar bills will likely face the same obstacles from
lobbyists as their predecessors in previous sessions. Consumer
13
Samuel Lee, Note, Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and
Data Safeguarding Now Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs, 1
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 125, 136 (2006) (citing Personal Data Privacy and
Security Act of 2005, S. 1789 109th Cong. (2005); Identity Theft Protection Act, S.
1408, 109th Cong. (2005); Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act, S. 1326, 109th
Cong. (2005); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2005);
Information Protection and Security Act, S. 500, 109th Cong. (2005); Information
Protection and Security Act, H.R. 1080, 109th Cong. (2005); Financial Data
Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong.; Consumer Data Notification and
Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3140, 109th Cong).
14
Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of
Personal Information, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 157 (2006).
15
See, e.g., Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong.;
Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong.; Data
Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007); Cyber-Security
Enhancement and Consumer Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 836, 110th Cong.
16
Data Breach Notification Act, S. 139, 111th Cong. (2009).
17
Personal Data Privacy and Security Act, S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009).
18
Data Security Act of 2010, S. 3579, 111th Cong.
19
Data Security and Breach Notification Act of 2010, S. 3742, 111th Cong.
20
Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009). Another
recently proposed bill, Building Effective Strategies To Promote Responsibility
Accountability Choice Transparency Innovation Consumer Expectations and
Safeguards Act, not discussed in this Note, is very different from the bills already
mentioned, explicitly refusing to preempt state data breach notification laws. H.R.
5777, 111th Cong. § 605(c) (2010).
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protection groups and their opponents do not show signs of
backing down.21 Before taking office in 2009, President Barack
Obama and his transition team attempted to restrict lobbyists in
Washington, D.C.22
Even so, lobbyists’ influence remains
strong.23 In 2009, the financial services industry alone spent over
$220 million on lobbying efforts.24 Between November 2008 and
March 2009, “more than 2,000 cities, companies, and
associations . . . hired lobbyists to help them push their agendas
on Capitol Hill and at the White House, easily outpacing such
numbers after the previous two elections.”25 Thus, lobbyists’
potential impact on a federal data breach notification law cannot
be ignored.
While the debate among industry lobbyists rages on, security
breaches continue to take place. Cybercriminals are adapting to
the changing market for stolen data, targeting not only people’s
most vulnerable data but also their most valuable.26 According to
the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a nonprofit consumer
information and advocacy organization, a total of 511,468,368

21
See Letter from Ctr. for Digital Democracy et al. to Energy & Commerce
Comm. Member (Sept. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Letter on H.R. 2221], available at
http://www.privacylives.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/hr2221preemption29sept09
.pdf (letter from various consumer protection groups); Letter from Am. Ass’n of
Adver. Agencies et al. to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm. & Jeff
Sessions, Ranking Member, Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Letter
on S. 1490], available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2009/letter-s1490-personal-data-privacy-and-security-act-2009 (letter from various business
groups on the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2009, S. 1490).
22
For example, President Obama’s transition team prohibited registered
lobbyists who had lobbied during the previous twelve months from working in the
policy areas on which they lobbied. See Helene Cooper & Jeff Zeleny, Obama’s
Transition Team Restricts Help of Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2008, at A19.
23
See Stephen Labaton, Lobbyists Mass to Try To Shape Financial Reform, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at B1 (“Even though President Obama vowed to change the
culture of corporate influence on Washington, the administration has contributed,
albeit inadvertently, to making this a banner year for lobbyists.”).
24
See id.
25
Ellen Nakashima & Brady Dennis, In a Down Time Everywhere Else, K Street
Bustles; Lobbyists Find Plenty of Work as Clients Contend for Stimulus Package’s
Billions, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2009, at A12.
26
See WADE H. BAKER ET AL., VERIZON BUSINESS, 2009 DATA BREACH
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 (2009), http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/
security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf. In 2009, it seems that the most sought
after data were Personal Identification Numbers (“PIN”) information. See id.
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records in the United States were compromised between 2005
and January 2011.27 Even the President of the United States has
been a victim.28
Clearly, it is time for legislators in Congress to reach a
compromise. This Note argues that a strict federal data breach
notification law would not only appease businesses tired of
having to comply with forty-six different state laws but would
also increase incentives for businesses to disclose by reducing the
cost of compliance and increasing the reputational risk
associated with security breaches. Part I of this Note examines
the current state of the law by exploring the elements of a data
breach notification law. This Part will compare various state
laws to the bills considered by the 111th Congress. Part II
analyzes lobbyists’ differing perspectives on the possibility of a
federal data breach notification law that preempts the state laws
currently in place. Taking into account all of these perspectives,
Part III draws conclusions regarding the form a federal data
breach notification law should take and focuses on giving
consumers increased control over the security of their own
personal data.
I.
A.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

The Legal Landscape

In 2003, businesses were required to comply with only one
state data breach notification law—California’s Database Breach
Notification Security Act.29 This law was the first of its kind and
is the model for many other data breach notification laws in the
United States.30 California’s statute remained the only data
breach notification law until March 31, 2005, when a similar
statute was passed in Arkansas.31

27
A chronology of data breaches is available at Chronology of Data Breaches,
PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last
updated Jan. 31, 2011).
28
In 2008, three State Department employees opened President Obama’s
electronic passport file, violating the Department’s privacy rules. See Helene Cooper,
State Dept. Finds Breaches of Obama’s File, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2008, at A19.
29
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2010).
30
See Raymond G. Mullady, Jr. & Scott D. Hansen, Identity Theft Litigation: A
Roadmap for Defense and Protection, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 563, 575.
31
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-101 to 108 (2010).
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After the enactment of California’s statute, businesses
involved in interstate commerce had to decide whether to do just
the bare minimum or whether to go beyond California’s statutory
requirements.32 For instance, consider the situation in which a
business that does not store customers’ mailing addresses suffers
a security breach. California’s statute requires notification to
California residents.33 Determining whether a customer is a
resident of California at the time of the breach would require this
business to collect more information than it otherwise would
have, thereby increasing the cost of doing business.34 However,
going beyond the requirements of the statute by notifying all of
the affected customers could have unintended consequences on
consumer opinion. Giving too many details about a possible
breach to too many people could lead to a loss of consumer loyalty
and a reduction in business.
California’s use of vague and indefinite language—a byproduct of legislators’ ignorance regarding computers, the
Internet, and technology—did not help businesses in making this
decision.35 Phrases in California’s statute such as “reasonably
believed”36 and “in the most expedient time possible”37 are vague
and subject to interpretation.38 The California legislature’s
failure to define these terms, as well as technical terms such as
“encrypted,” has left businesses uncertain as to whether the
strength of their security policies is in proportion to the
sensitivities of the types of data they collect.39
Businesses operating today must deal with the same
questions as their counterparts in 2003; however, because many
states have adjusted their statutes to rectify what they see as
weaknesses in California’s statutory language, the legal

environment has become much more complicated.

State

32
See Timothy H. Skinner, California’s Database Breach Notification Security
Act: The First State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for
National Identity Theft Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2003).
33
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a).
34
See Skinner, supra note 32, at 7–8.
35
See id. at 8.
36
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a).
37
Id.
38
See Brandon Faulkner, Note, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59
FLA. L. REV. 1097, 1110–11 (2007).
39
See Skinner, supra note 32, at 11–12.
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legislatures’ attempts to rectify California’s vague language have
created a myriad of laws with differing requirements.
Any of the bills proposed in the 111th Congress would reduce
the complicated statutory structure currently in place by
preempting all of these state laws.40 S. 139 and S. 1490 (“Senate
bills”) and H.R. 2221 were all introduced in previous sessions of
Congress.41 The two Senate bills have identical sections on
notification.42 H.R. 2221 and S. 3742 (“House-Senate bills”) also
have identical language on notification, with a few minor
differences.43 S. 3579 has the least comprehensive notification
provision of them all, leaving much to federal agencies to
regulate.44
These bills did not just suddenly appear. Senator Diane
Feinstein of California introduced S. 139 back in 2003, soon after
California’s law was enacted.45 She continues to support the bill,
emphasizing that the threat of identity theft is growing and can
no longer be ignored.46 Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont first
introduced S. 1490 in 2005 with “high hopes of bringing urgently
needed data privacy reforms to the American people.”47 H.R.
2221 was first introduced in the 109th Congress48 and has since
passed in the House.49 If bills such as these have been on

40
These bills require more than just notification in the event of a security
breach. For instance, S. 1490 requires the implementation of data security programs
and increased penalties for identity theft. See S. 1490, 111th Cong. (2009). However,
analysis of these provisions is beyond the scope of this Note, which only examines
the requirement of notification in the event of a data breach.
41
See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong.;
Notification of Risk to Personal Data Act of 2007, S. 239, 110th Cong.; Data
Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 958, 110th Cong. (2007).
42
See S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 311 (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
43
See S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009).
44
See S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 4 (2010).
45
155 CONG. REC. S7871 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Diane
Feinstein).
46
Id. (“According to a report by the Identity Theft Resource Center, the news
media reported more than 620 breaches involving personal information during 2008.
That works out to about one data security breach every 14 hours—and those are just
the ones that are big enough to be covered in the media.”).
47
155 CONG. REC. S7871 (daily ed. July 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy).
48
The Data Accountability and Trust Act: Hearing on H.R. 2221 and H.R. 1319
Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of
Rep. Bobby L. Rush).
49
H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2221.
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Congress’s agenda since 2003, why is it taking so long for
Congress to pass a data breach notification law?
As will be discussed in further detail below, data breach
notification laws failed to pass in previous sessions of Congress
because critics believe that many of the same deficiencies that
plague California’s law are also present in the federal bills. In
order to understand these criticisms, it is necessary to first
analyze the main elements of a data breach notification law.
B.

The Elements of a Data Breach Notification Law

Every data breach notification law attempts to address the
following major subjects: (1) the definition of “security breach”
and the element of harm; (2) the definition of “personal
information”; (3) who must be notified and when delivery must be
completed; (4) how individuals must be notified and what
information must be included in the notification; and (5) the
penalties for failing to notify affected individuals. As will be
discussed below, slight differences in language have a great
impact on what businesses are required to do in the event of a
security breach.
1.

The Definition of a “Security Breach” and the Element of
Harm

Whether to include the element of harm in the definition of
“security breach” is the central issue in the debate over any data
breach notification law. Many states have struggled with the
fact that California’s statute requires no additional element of
harm to trigger notification.50 Instead, the California statute
defines “security breach” as the “unauthorized acquisition of
computerized data that compromises the security, confidentiality,
or integrity of personal information maintained by
the . . . business.”51 The trigger for notification is based on
acquisition alone. Unauthorized acquisition or a “reasonable
belief” that unauthorized acquisition has occurred is enough for
the statute’s notice requirements to apply.52 Critics say that this
50
See Brendan St. Amant, Recent Development, The Misplaced Role of Identity
Theft in Triggering Public Notice of Database Breaches, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 505,
520–25 (2007).
51
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d) (West 2010).
52
Id. § 1798.82(a).
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could trigger over-notification, desensitizing the public to the
severity of security breaches.53
New York has taken a different approach. While it does not
require an additional element of harm, it does list several
factors that can be used by businesses to determine “whether
information has been acquired, or is reasonably believed to have
been acquired, by an unauthorized person.”54 The factors are:
(1) indications that the information is in the physical possession
and control of an unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen
computer or other device containing information; or
(2) indications that the information has been downloaded or
copied; or (3) indications that the information was used by an
unauthorized person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or
instances of identity theft reported.55

Thus, New York has taken a middle-of-the road approach; it has
elaborated upon California’s law but has stopped short of
requiring harm.
In contrast, states such as Louisiana, Missouri, and North
Carolina have elected to add an additional element of harm,
deciding that a risk of harm rather than an unauthorized
acquisition should be the trigger for notification. In these states,
notification is not required when businesses determine that
identity theft is not likely to result,56 “where illegal use of the
personal information has [not] occurred or is [not] reasonably
likely to occur or [where the breach] creates [no] material risk of
harm to a consumer.”57
Currently, businesses conducting interstate commerce that
want to comply with all of the state notification laws can send
letters to every individual whose personal information has been
acquired or is reasonably believed to have been acquired by an
unauthorized person, regardless of whether or not there is a
significant risk of harm. In doing so, they choose the broadest
trigger—California’s trigger of unauthorized acquisition.58 If
they choose the broadest trigger, businesses do not need to
ascertain whether each state’s statutory language includes an
element of harm, saving them both time and money. Thus,
53
54
55
56
57
58

See Skinner, supra note 32, at 8–9.
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(c) (McKinney 2010).
Id.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074(G) (2010).
Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(14) (2010).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010).
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despite each state’s attempt to limit unnecessary notification of
consumers, among businesses conducting interstate commerce,
there is really only one trigger—California’s trigger.
The federal bills hoped to change this state of affairs.
Although they do not significantly change California’s definition
of “security breach,” they do include an additional element of
harm. The Senate bills’ definition is very similar to California’s
definition, defining “security breach” as a “compromise of the
security, confidentiality, or integrity of computerized data
through misrepresentation or actions that result in, or there is a
reasonable basis to conclude has resulted in, acquisition of or
access to [personal information] that is unauthorized or in excess
of authorization.”59
Notification, however, is not required
if a business: (1) conducts a “risk assessment” that
“concludes . . . there is no significant risk that a security breach
has resulted in, or will result in, harm to the individuals whose
sensitive personally identifiable information was subject to the
security breach”; (2) sends the results of the assessment to the
Secret Service; and (3) receives no indication from the Secret
Service that notification should still be given.60 There is a
presumption that there is no “significant risk” where information
was encrypted or redacted.61
The House-Senate bills’ definition is even simpler than the
Senate bills’, defining “security breach” rather simply as
“unauthorized access to or acquisition of data in electronic form
containing personal information.”62 No notification is required
where the entity determines “that there is no reasonable risk of
identity theft, fraud, or other unlawful conduct.”63 Once again,
there is a presumption of no “reasonable risk” if the breached
data is protected by encryption.64
S. 3579 adds significantly to this discussion, defining “breach
of data security” as “the unauthorized acquisition of sensitive
account information or sensitive personal information,” while
also including an exception for encrypted information.65
59

S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 3(11)(A) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 13(6)(A) (2009).
S. 1490 § 312(b)(1); S. 139 § 3(b)(1).
61
S. 1490 § 312(b)(1); S. 139 § 3(b)(2). For a definition of “encryption,” see infra
note 88 and accompanying text.
62
S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 5(1) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 5(1) (2009).
63
S. 3742 § 3(f)(1); H.R. 2221 § 3(f)(1).
64
S. 3742 § 3(f)(2)(A); H.R. 2221, § 3(f)(2)(A).
65
S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2010).
60
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Notification is required only if, after an investigation, the entity
determines that the breach is “reasonably likely to be misused in
a manner causing substantial harm or inconvenience.”66 The bill
even goes so far as to define the term “substantial harm or
inconvenience” as “material financial loss to, or civil or criminal
penalties imposed on, a consumer . . . ; or . . . the need for a
consumer to expend significant time and effort to correct
erroneous information relating to the consumer . . . , in order to
avoid material financial loss, increase costs, or civil or criminal
penalties.”67 The term does not include having to change an
account number, and the harm must result from “identity theft
or account fraud.”68
2.

The Definition of “Personal Information”

Like the term “security breach,” the term “personal
information” is highly debated.
In California, “personal
information” is defined as “an individual’s first name or first
initial and last name in combination with any” of the following:
(1) a social security number; (2) a driver’s license number or
California identification card number; (3) an “[a]ccount number,
credit or debit card number, in combination with any required
security code, access code, or password that would permit access
to [the] individual’s financial account”; and (4) medical or health
insurance information.69 In addition, either the individual’s
name or the information accompanying the individual’s name
must be “unencrypted.”70 The statute does not define the term
“encrypted.”71
This definition raises two issues. The first issue is whether
the statute should cover only computerized data.72 The Senate
bills and the House-Senate bills apply only to computerized or
electronic data.73 S. 3579 makes no such distinction.74 Some
states have expanded their statutes to cover more than just
66

Id. § 3(b)–(c).
Id. § 2(11)(A).
68
Id. § 2(11)(B).
69
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e) (West 2010).
70
Id.
71
See § 1798.82.
72
See Skinner, supra note 32, at 10.
73
S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2010); S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 3(11)(A) (2009);
H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 13(6)(A) (2009).
74
S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2010).
67
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computerized data. For example, Indiana’s statute “includes the
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that have been
transferred to another medium, including paper, microfilm, or a
similar medium, even if the transferred data are no longer in a
computerized format.”75 Similarly, Massachusetts, which has
passed one of the most progressive state privacy laws in the
United States,76 expanded its statute even further, covering
“[a]ny material upon which written, drawn, spoken, visual, or
electromagnetic information or images are recorded or preserved,
regardless of physical form or characteristics.”77
The second issue is whether California’s definition of
“personal information” is broad enough to protect consumers
from identity theft.78 New York has adopted a broader definition
than California’s, defining “personal information” as “any
information concerning a natural person which, because of name,
number, personal mark, or other identifier, can be used to
identify such natural person.”79 However, the end result is not
much different. New York distinguishes between “personal
information” and “private information,” the latter being defined
in the same way California defines “personal information.”80
Because the statute applies only to businesses in possession of
“private information,”81 New York has not really altered
California’s original definition. Other states have been more
progressive, opting to make specific additions to their statutes,
including information such as taxpayer identification numbers,
biometric data, and mothers’ maiden names, in their lists of
protected data.82

75

IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-2 (2010). Indiana also carves out a special exception for
electronic data on portable devices, such as laptops, providing that a security breach
“does not include . . . [u]nauthorized acquisition of a portable electronic device on
which personal information is stored, if all personal information on the device is
protected by encryption and the encryption key.” Id.
76
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1 (2010); see also Danzig et al., supra note 1, at
64.
77
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1.
78
See Amant, supra note 50, at 525–26.
79
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(a) (McKinney 2010).
80
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e) (West 2010); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899aa(1)(b).
81
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2)–(3).
82
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(1)(iv) (LexisNexis 2010);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802(5)(e) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(2)(a)(6) (2010).
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Supporters of the federal bills agree that California’s
definition is too narrow. The House-Senate bills define “personal
information” as “an individual’s first name or initial and last
name, or address, or phone number, in combination with any
[one] or more of the following”: (1) a social security number; (2) a
driver’s license or other state identification number; or (3) a
“[f]inancial account number or credit or debit card number, and
any required [code or password].”83 Although this definition is
very similar to California’s definition, the bill leaves room for
some flexibility, stating that the definition of “personal
information” may be modified by the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) “to accommodate changes in technology or practices.”84
The Senate bills go a bit further, deciding instead to make
specific additions to the definition. Among the additions are a
“passport number, or alien registration number, . . . [and]
biometric data.”85 Any two of the following would also suffice in
combination with the individual’s name: (1) a “[h]ome address or
telephone number”; (2) “[m]other’s maiden name”; or
(3) “[m]onth, day, and year of birth.”86 S. 3579 adds taxpayer
identification numbers to its list of protected data.87
The federal bills also set forth another improvement—all of
them, with the exception of S. 3579, offer a definition of
encryption. The Senate bills and the House-Senate bills define
encryption as “the protection of data in electronic form in storage
or in transit using an encryption technology that has been
adopted by an established standards setting body which
renders such data indecipherable in the absence of associated
cryptographic keys.”88 This definition provides consumers with
more protection by precluding businesses from arguing that a
simple eight-character password qualifies as encryption.
3.

Who Must Be Notified and When Delivery Must Be
Completed

With respect to both the “who” and the “when,” data breach
notification laws distinguish between businesses that own or

83
84
85
86
87
88

S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 5(9)(A) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 5(7)(A) (2009).
S. 3742 § 5(9)(B); H.R. 2221 § 5(7)(B).
S. 139, 111th Cong. § 13(7) (2009); S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 3(12) (2009).
S. 139 § 13(7); S. 1490 § 3(12).
S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 2(10)(A) (2010).
S. 3742 § 5(5); S. 1490 § 3(7); H.R. 2221 § 5(4); S. 139 § 13(4).
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license personal information (“Owners”) and businesses that
maintain personal information that is owned and licensed by
others (“Maintainers”). This distinction is made, presumably, to
prevent any confusion over which entity is responsible for giving
notice in the event that both entities are victims of the same
breach. For instance, California’s law provides that following the
occurrence of a security breach, Owners must notify “any
resident of California whose unencrypted personal information
was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person,”89 while Maintainers need only inform “the
owner or licensee of the information” in question.90
The Senate bills and the House-Senate bills also distinguish
between Owners and Maintainers. Like California, the HouseSenate bills require a Maintainer to notify only the Owner.91
Owners, on the other hand, must “notify each individual who is a
citizen or resident of the United States whose personal
information was acquired or accessed as a result of such a breach
of security.”92 The Senate bills are very different. Unless an
agreement is made between the Owner and the Maintainer, the
Maintainer must notify both the Owner and any affected
residents, or risk violating the act.93 The Maintainer is only
relieved of this duty when the Owner notifies the affected
individuals first.94 Presumably, should one of the Senate bills
pass, most Owners and Maintainers would amend their contracts
to make it clear which entity is responsible for sending notice
because clarifying this separation of duties would avoid confusion
and help protect the parties from liability. The language of S.
3579 does not distinguish between Owners and Maintainers.
Instead, both Owners and Maintainers are considered “covered
entit[ies]” and must notify “all consumers to whom the [personal
information] relates.”95
In addition to notifying affected consumers, many states also
require entities to notify a consumer reporting agency when a
certain threshold number of individuals has been affected to
allow for the maintenance of information on such breaches at a
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010).
Id. § 1798.82(b).
S. 3742 § 3(b)(1); H.R. 2221 § 3(b)(1).
S. 3742 § 3(a)(1); H.R. 2221 § 3(a)(1).
S. 1490 § 311(a)–(b); S. 139 § 2(a)–(b).
S. 1490 § 311(b)(3); S. 139 § 2(b)(3).
See S. 3579, 111th Cong. §§ 2(7)(A), 3(c)(1) (2010).
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national level.96 The Senate bills and S. 3579 include similar
provisions. If over 5,000 individuals have been affected by a
breach, notice must also be given to consumer reporting
agencies.97
The House-Senate bills have no comparable
provision.
In certain circumstances, some states also require that
parties inform the state attorney general.98 At the state level,
private sector lobbyists have succeeded in states such as Indiana,
where they were able to block an amendment that would have
required notification to the state attorney general, who could
then post information regarding the breach on a website.99
“Lobbyists decried the provision, claiming it would provide
phishers a golden opportunity to prey on unsuspecting
consumers. The phishers would use the site against its intended
purpose, lobbyists argued, by targeting visitors and getting them
to input personal information.”100 Microsoft, AT&T, and Verizon
were among those objecting to the Indiana bill.101 Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger of California blocked a similar
amendment in October 2010.102
In addition to consumers and consumer reporting agencies,
other entities must be notified as well. The House-Senate bills
require that Owners notify the FTC;103 the Senate bills require
business to notify the United States Secret Service and the

96
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(12) (2005). A consumer reporting agency is an
“agency that compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis.”
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(p) (2006). It must “regularly engage[ ] in the practice of
assembling . . . and maintaining, for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit
capacity, each of the following . . . : (1) [p]ublic record information [and] (2) [c]redit
account information.” Id.
97
S. 3579 § 3(c)(1)(D); S. 1490 § 315; S. 139 § 6.
98
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65(f) (2009) (requiring notification to the
Attorney General where 1,000 or more consumers are involved).
99
Bruce E. H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, Recent Developments in Commercial
Speech and Consumer Privacy Interests, in PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 53, 69 (2008).
100
Id.
101
Chris Soghoian, Industry Giants Lobby To Kill Pro-Consumer Data-Breach
Legislation, CNET NEWS (Feb. 5, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13739_3-9865076
-46.html.
102
Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gov. of Cal., to the Members of the Cal.
State Senate (Oct. 10, 2009) (vetoing S. 20), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/
09-10/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sb_20_vt_20091011.html.
103
S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2009).
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media,104 and S. 3579 requires “covered entities” to notify: (1) a
designated federal agency; (2) a law enforcement agency; and
(3) any entity that owns “a financial account to which the
[personal information] relates.”105
States have gone different ways with regard to when
notification must be sent. In California, whereas Owners must
notify residents “in the most expedient time possible and without
unreasonable delay,”106 Maintainers must notify the Owners
“immediately.”107 Delays to accommodate the “needs of law
enforcement [in conducting a criminal investigation] . . . or . . . to
determine the scope of the breach and restore the reasonable
integrity of the data system” are considered reasonable.108 A few
states have declined to follow California’s approach, deciding
instead on a bright line rule. For example, Florida and Ohio both
require notification within forty-five days.109
With respect to timing, the Senate bills and the
Senate-House bills have taken different paths. The Senate bills
retain California’s vague language, requiring businesses to
deliver notification “without unreasonable delay following the
discovery . . . of a security breach.”110 As in California, delays to
accommodate the need to “determine the scope of the security
breach, prevent further disclosures, and restore the reasonable
integrity of the data system” or to accommodate the needs of law
enforcement are considered reasonable.111 The House-Senate
bills, on the other hand, make an attempt at clarification,
requiring businesses to provide notice within sixty days absent
“extraordinary circumstances,” while still accommodating the
needs of law enforcement and national security agencies.112

104

S. 1490, 111th Cong. §§ 313(2), 316 (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. §§ 4(2), 7

(2009).
105

S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 3(c)(1)(C) (2010).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010).
107
Id. § 1798.82(b).
108
Id. § 1798.82(a).
109
FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(1)(a) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1347.12(B)(2)
(LexisNexis 2010) (covering government agencies); id. § 1349.19(B)(2) (covering
private entities).
110
S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 311(c)(1) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2009).
111
S. 1490 § 311(c)(2), (d); S. 139 § 2(c)(2), (d).
112
S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2009).
106
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S.3579 has failed to address this topic, giving federal agencies
the power to issue regulations regarding the standards that
should apply.113
4.

How Individuals Must Be Notified and What Information
Must Be Included in the Notification

Any data breach notification law must address the manner
in which notification may be given. California’s statute provides
that notification may be given via “written notice” or via
“electronic notice.”114 The same is said in the House-Senate
bills.115 S. 3579 and the Senate bills similarly allow notice to be
given in writing or via e-mail and additionaly permit notice by
telephone.116
In California, “substitute notice” is permitted if the entity
“demonstrates that the cost of providing notice would exceed
[$250,000], or that the affected class of subject persons to be
notified exceeds 500,000, or the [entity] does not have sufficient
contact information” to provide direct notice.117 “Substitute
notice” consists of an e-mail, a “conspicuous” posting on the
entity’s website, and notification to statewide media.118 The
House-Senate bills also allow for “substitute notice” but only in
narrow circumstances—when the database in question contains
the information of fewer than 1,000 people and direct notification
cannot be given due to excessive cost or a “lack of sufficient
contact information for the individual required to be notified.”119
According to the House-Senate bills, the notification need only
inform consumers that they may receive two years of free credit
reports in certain circumstances and a telephone number by
which they can learn if their personal information has been
compromised.120 S. 3579 also allows for “substitute notice,” but it
is less clear than the House-Senate bills, leaving the details to
federal agencies to regulate.121 The Senate bills contain no
provision allowing for “substitute notice.”
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

See S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 4(e) (2010).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (g)(1)–(2) (West 2010).
S. 3742 § 3(d)(1)(A); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(1)(A).
S. 3579 § 4(c)(2)(A); S. 1490 § 313(1)(B); S. 139 § 4(1)(B).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (g)(3).
Id.
S. 3742 § 3(d)(2)(A)(ii); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(2)(A)(ii).
S. 3742 § 3(d)(2)(C); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(2)(C).
See S. 3579 § 4(c)(2)(B).
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State statutes vary with regard to what information must be
included in the notice. On this subject, California is silent.122
Therefore, the letters and e-mails sent to California residents do
not need to be very specific. Specific disclosure is only required
upon the affected resident’s request.123 Other states have filled in
this gap, requiring businesses to provide affected individuals
with descriptions of the breach, the types of personal information
compromised, contact information for consumer reporting
agencies, and various tips on how to prevent identity theft.124
On this subject, the House and Senate seem to agree that
California’s law is too vague. The House-Senate bills provide
that notification must include: (1) a description of the personal
information compromised; (2) a telephone number for the
business; (3) notice that the individual may receive two years of
free credit reports in certain circumstances; (4) the addresses and
toll-free numbers for credit reporting agencies; and (5) the
website and the toll-free number for the FTC.125 Similarly the
Senate bills require that each notice include:
(1) a description of the categories of sensitive personally
identifiable information that was, or is reasonably believed to
have been . . . acquired by an unauthorized person; (2) a toll-free
number [through which the individual can contact the business
for more information]; and (3) the toll-free contact telephone
numbers and addresses for the major credit reporting
agencies.126

In addition, individual states may require the inclusion of
information regarding “victim protection assistance” provided in
their particular states.127 Once again, the drafters of S. 3579
declined to take the initiative in this area, leaving much of the
planning to federal agencies; nevertheless, they do require that
there be: (1) a description of the personal information that was

122

See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82.
Id. § 1798.83(a).
124
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.2(5) (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW § 14-3504(g) (West 2010).
125
S. 3742 § 3(d)(1)(B); H.R. 2221 § 3(d)(1)(B). Here, the language in the two
bills diverges slightly with S. 3742 also requiring that the notice contain “the date,
estimated date, or estimated date range of the [security breach].” S. 3742
§ 3(d)(1)(B)(i).
126
S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 314(a) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2010).
127
S. 1490 § 314(b); S. 139 § 5(b).
123
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breached; (2) a description of what the business has done to
secure that information; and (3) a summary of the victim’s
rights.128
5.

The Penalties for Failing To Notify Affected Individuals

Another subject of contention is whether individuals should
be allowed a private right of action against businesses that fail to
notify them of a security breach.129 Allowing a private right of
action can create an increased incentive for businesses to comply
with state law; however, the benefits to plaintiffs are limited.
These lawsuits are usually based on claims of negligence or
breach of contract.130 Therefore, plaintiffs are required to show
more likely than not that the breach—the failure to notify—
caused the plaintiff’s injuries.131 This places an extremely heavy
burden on the plaintiff. California permits any customer injured
by a violation of the notification law to sue the offending business
and recover damages.132 In addition to California, ten states and
the District of Columbia allow a private right of action,133 but in
many states, only the state attorney general may sue for a failure
to comply.134
None of the federal bills allow for a private right of action.
The Senate bills, however, do allow the United States Attorney
General to bring a civil action against businesses that violate the
act for damages not to exceed $1,000 per day, per individual up to
a maximum of $1,000,000 per violation.135 In addition, the
Attorney General may apply to the court to enjoin businesses
from violating the statute’s requirements.136 The Senate bills
also allow state attorneys general to bring actions against
businesses when they believe that “an interest of the residents of
[their] State[s] has been or is threatened or adversely affected by
the engagement of a business entity in a practice that” violates
128

S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 4(d) (2010).
See Skinner, supra note 32, at 14.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) (West 2010).
133
SCOTT P. COOPER ET AL., State Privacy Laws, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY
2010, § 5:5.5[B][9] (PLI 2010) (District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and Washington).
134
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(6)(a) (McKinney 2010).
135
S. 1490, 111th Cong. § 317(a) (2009); S. 139, 111th Cong. § 8(a) (2010).
136
S. 1490 § 317(b); S. 139 § 8(b).
129
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the act.137 However, no state attorney general may bring such an
action at the same time as the United States Attorney General.138
The penalties for violating House-Senate bills are similar to the
penalties in the Senate bills. However, the FTC, rather than the
Attorney General, would commence the civil action,139 and the
maximum
civil
penalty
cannot
exceed
$5,000,000.140
Furthermore, according to the House-Senate bills any violation
would be treated as an “unfair and deceptive act” under
15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B).141
S. 3579 relies on administrative
enforcement and precludes state attorneys general from
instituting civil or criminal actions.142
II. ANALYZING LOBBYISTS’ PERSPECTIVES ON PREEMPTION
With regard to lobbyists and special interests, the main
debate is whether a federal data breach notification law should
preempt the many state laws currently in place.143 Once again,
this Note argues that a strict federal data breach notification law
that preempts state laws will provide increased protection to
consumers in the United States.
While industry groups and consumer protection groups
support the creation of a federal law,144 the latter do not want
states to lose the power to enact stricter protections than the
137

S. 1490 § 318; S. 139 § 9.
S. 1490 § 318(c); S. 139 § 9(c).
139
S. 3742, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2010); H.R. 2221, 111th Cong. § 4(b) (2009).
140
S. 3742 § 4(c)(2)(C)(ii); H.R. 2221 § 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
141
S. 3742 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 2221 § 4(b)(1).
142
S. 3579, 111th Cong. § 5 (2010).
143
See Lee, supra note 13, at 143–44.
144
See Letter on S. 1490, supra note 21 (“The U.S. has a national economy, and
almost every state has enacted various data security and breach notification
provisions, many of which differ from one another in material ways. A federal
security breach notification standard that is not only inconsistent with these laws,
but also with other federal laws would create regulatory uncertainty and require
notification in circumstances where individuals face no risk of identity theft or
financial harm.”); Letter on H.R. 2221, supra note 21 (“We [the undersigned leading
consumer groups] applaud the sponsors for including in the bill some of the
strongest public policy provisions of any bill before the Congress to address the
myriad data security and privacy problems that have been identified following years
of well-publicized security breaches at some of the nation’s largest firms.”); Letter
from Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Acting Director, ACLU, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
Sen. Judiciary Comm. & Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member of Sen. Judiciary Comm. 6
(Nov. 2, 2009), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ltr_support_S1490.pdf
(“We support S. 1490 because it is a common sense effort to regulate an industry
that desperately needs it.”).
138
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federal government.145 On the industry side, the Securities
Industry Association, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., and
Microsoft have all expressed their support for federal
legislation.146 These groups hope to increase certainty and reduce
the confusion that comes with complying with so many state
laws.147 They hope to secure a weak federal law that preempts
state laws.148
On the other side of the debate are consumer protections
groups, which, in true Jeffersonian fashion, do not want a federal
law to preempt the various state laws.149 According to groups
such as the Center for Digital Democracy, the U.S. Public
Interest Research Group (“PIRG”), the Consumer Federation of
America, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse, a “federal law should always serve as a
floor, not a ceiling.”150 These groups argue that the states provide
a valuable laboratory for the creation of public policy and should
not be prohibited from experimenting.151
145
Letter on H.R. 2221, supra note 21 (“[T]he bill . . . includes unacceptable
preemptive language . . . , despite strong evidence that the states have led . . . on
identity theft and other privacy protection issues.”).
146
Lee, supra note 13, at 143–44.
147
See id.
148
See Letter on S. 1490, supra note 21 (“We [the undersigned industry groups]
believe that this legislation should exempt entities covered by other federal security
breach and data security laws and that the preemption standards should explicitly
preempt all state laws relating to any activity covered under this Act.”). The private
sector has spent a lot of money fighting on this issue. When the Lobbying Disclosure
Act Database is searched, ChoicePoint, eBay Inc., Bank of America, N.A., and
Microsoft are just a few of the entities that appear. Although these filings do not
indicate which side of the debate these entities are on, it is clear that many large
private sector entities are willing to spend on this issue. In 2006, the year after it
suffered that devastating breach, ChoicePoint reported that it spent $588,000
lobbying on its own behalf regarding data breach legislation in both the House and
the Senate. That same year, eBay Inc. reported spending more than $1,085,000 on
lobbying. Some of this money was spent on bills introduced in the 109th Congress to
address data security. Bank of America, N.A., which spent a total of $1,020,000 in
the second half of 2006, reports spending money on some of the same bills. The
Lobbying Disclosure Act Database can be found at http://soprweb.senate.gov/
index.cfm?event=choosefields.
149
Lee, supra note 13, at 143.
150
Letter on H.R. 2221, supra note 21.
151
Id.; see also Flora J. Garcia, Note, Data Protection, Breach Notification, and
the Interplay Between State and Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time, 17
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 693, 726 (2007) (“State laws are
beginning to address the remedies at the roots of the malady, the laissez-faire
attitudes of some companies and agencies about data security and protection, and a
marketplace with many different approaches is a robust test of what the best
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Unfortunately, this debate has hindered the development of
a federal data breach notification law for too long. As already
stated, the myriad of state laws currently in place has created a
complex legal environment for businesses that are victims of
security breaches. As victims, businesses should not be forced to
bear all the costs.152 If a federal law does not come to fruition,
businesses will continue to be hounded with complicated
questions resulting from a thorny statutory scheme. In an age
where e-commerce and the Internet have become important
means of conducting business, such complications severely
increase the costs of operating in the United States and lead to
uncertainty and hesitation.
The debate over a federal data breach notification law is not
necessarily the best arena for ensuring that businesses take on
the proper burden. Although the private sector is in the best
position to prevent security breaches from happening,153 it is
difficult to determine whether notification laws have actually had
a significant impact on reducing the occurrence of breaches.154

remedies will be at this still-nascent point in the development of electronic data
storage.”). This is a common argument in the arena of consumer protection law. For
instance, professors of consumer law and banking law who support the creation of a
federal Consumer Financial Protection Agency argue that the merits of preemption
are outweighed by the value of having states operate as laboratories . . . . It
is important that Congress not take a simplistic approach favoring only
federal development of consumer protection laws . . . ; and that Congress
not limit the role of the states to enforcement of state and federal law.
State legislatures and courts need to be able to continue to develop
consumer protection law . . . . In addition, problems are much more likely to
grow larger if they can be addressed only at the federal level and not also
by states where they first appear.
Richard M. Alderman et al., A Communication from Academic Faculty Who Teach
Courses Related to Consumer Law and Banking Law at American Law Schools 5
(Sept. 29, 2009), http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf.
152
See Lilia Rode, Comment, Database Security Breach Notification Statutes:
Does Placing the Responsibility on the True Victim Increase Data Security?, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1627 (2007).
153
Kathryn E. Picanso, Note, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform
Data Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 390 (2006).
154
See S. Kasim Ravzi, Comment, To What Extent Should State Legislatures
Regulate Business Practices as a Means of Preventing Identity Theft?, 15 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 639, 657–58 (2005). A study on breach notifications conducted by the
Ponemon Institute revealed that thirty-nine percent of respondents believed the
notification was “junk mail, spam or a telemarketing phone call” and that fifty
percent of the respondents still did nothing new to protect themselves against
identify theft. Ponemon Inst. LLC, National Survey on Data Security Breach
Notification 10, 17 (2005), available at http://www.whitecase.com/files/
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Advances in technology and the development of new business
practices have also had an effect.155 Therefore, lobbyists’ energies
may be better spent in areas that will increase the use of such
technologies and practices.
In addition, fighting preemption has left the residents of
some states completely unprotected. Even now, over four years
after the ChoicePoint breach, businesses in four states—
Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota—are not
required to notify individuals when their personal information
has been compromised. Even though two of these states,
Alabama and Kentucky, reported that in 2007, Internet related
complaints were among the top ten consumer complaints
received by their attorneys general,156 legislators in these states
remain idle. Although “[s]tate legislatures . . . need to be able to
continue to develop consumer protection law,”157 in general, the
experiment should be over with regard to notification. Congress
should not have to wait until these states decide to protect their
consumers when it has the ability to protect them now.
III. THE COMPROMISE: A STRICT DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION
LAW THAT PREEMPTS STATE LAWS
The best way to protect consumers’ personal information is
to implement a strict federal data breach notification law that
preempts the forty-six state laws currently in place. A strict
federal law would increase incentives for businesses to comply by
reducing the cost of compliance and increasing the reputational
harm associated with security breaches. Increased notification
gives consumers more control over their own personal
information. The following discussion is broken up into two
parts. Part A discusses the goal of this law—increased consumer
control. Part B revisits the five major elements of a data breach
notification law, making recommendations on the form each
element should take at the federal level.

FileControl/863d572d-cde3-4e33-903c-37eaba537060/7483b893-e478-44a4-8fedf49aa917d8cf/Presentation/File/Security_Breach_Survey%5B1%5D.pdf.
155
Ravzi, supra note 154.
156
REECE RUSHING, ARI SCHWARTZ & ALISSA COOPER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
& CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ONLINE CONSUMERS AT RISK AND THE ROLE OF
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 9 (2008), available at http://cdt.org/privacy/
20080812_ag_consumer_risk.pdf.
157
Alderman et al., supra note 151, at 5.
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The Goal: Increasing Consumers’ Ability To Control Their
Personal Information

A strict federal data breach notification law will increase
consumers’ ability to control their personal information. In the
context of informational privacy,
[c]ontrol . . . refers to the fact that it is in many respects in a
person’s hands—and in other respects she can at least guess—
what others know about her in any particular instance, that she
can thus make well-founded assumptions concerning what the
people or institutions she deals with know about her, and that
in accordance with these assumptions and expectations she may
also possess corresponding possibilities for penalizing or at least
criticizing infractions.158

Increasing consumer control involves two important policy
goals. First, a consumer can only have control over his or her
personal information if he or she knows who is in possession of it;
therefore, increased control requires increased disclosure.
Disclosure “helps the market to function properly by assisting
customers when choosing whether to deal with (or stop dealing
with) a particular institution.”159 Without a strict law, most
businesses will disclose as little as possible.160 They do not want
to see their revenue decrease after “40% of consumers consider[ ]
discontinuing their relationship with [them].”161 Thus, any
federal law must contain language ensuring that businesses do
not have a way of escaping their notification requirements. In
addition, it must be specific about what information businesses
are required to disclose. The more detail included in the
notification, the more control a person has over his or her
personal information. An added benefit of increased disclosure is
that it will aid in deterring hackers and identity thieves from
violating the law.162 If individuals are put on notice that their
personal information has been accessed, they will be much more
vigilant, reviewing their banking statements and ordering credit
reports. Because notified individuals are more likely to report
discrepancies, hackers are more likely to get caught.

158
BEATE ROSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY 111 (2005) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
159
Janger & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 234.
160
See Amant, supra note 50, at 523–24.
161
Id. at 517.
162
Id. at 524.
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Second, increased control requires that the federal
government give businesses more of an incentive to improve
security by increasing reputational costs.163 Statistical analyses
show that “[t]he challenged macroeconomic backdrop” is causing
companies to cut back in all areas, including security.164
Companies continue to reduce information security budgets and
many do not have privacy programs in place.165 This is occurring
even though many system attacks are not difficult to prevent.166
Poor information security leads not only to an increased number
of breaches but also to long delays in determining how the breach
occurred. Although there is no statistically significant data
proving that data breach laws reduce levels of fraud and identity
theft,167 strict statutes still have the ability to encourage
businesses to take preventative measures to prevent the
reputational harm that results from a breach. A lax federal
notification law, on the other hand, will do nothing to increase
investment in security. Instead, it will signal to businesses that
the federal government is not concerned about consumer privacy.
B.

Recommendations for a Federal Law

Keeping the goal of increasing consumer control in mind,
this Part revisits the five major elements of a data breach
notification law: (1) the definition of “security breach” and the
element of harm; (2) the definition of “personal information”;
(3) who must be notified and when delivery must be completed;
163
See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data
Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 929 (2007), for more on reputational costs.
164
See, e.g., DELOITTE, LOSING GROUND: 2009 TMT GLOBAL SECURITY SURVEY 3
(2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Norway/Local%20Assets/
Documents/tmt_securitysurvey2009.pdf.
165
See id. at 5 (noting that, among the surveyed companies, thirty-two percent
reduced their information security budget, while twenty-five percent raised their
budget less than five percent). These declining or minimally increasing security
investments may not be enough to keep pace with the growing list of challenges,
emerging technologies, and increasingly sophisticated attacks. Baker et al., supra
note 26, at 39 (finding that only twenty-eight percent of victims had an incident
response system in place).
166
See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 3 (“Most of these incidents do not require
difficult or expensive preventative controls; mistakes and oversight hinder security
efforts more than a lack of resources.”).
167
See Alana Maurushat, Data Breach Notification Law Across the World from
California to Australia (Univ. of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series,
Paper 11, 2009), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1153
&context=unswwps.
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(4) how individuals must be notified and what information must
be included in the notification; and (5) the penalties for failing to
notify affected individuals.168
1.

The Definition of a “Security Breach” and the Element of
Harm

With regard to what level of harm should trigger
notification, California’s approach with a slight modification is
still the best way to increase disclosure while retaining the
important incentive of reputational harm. California’s statute
provides that unauthorized acquisition or a “reasonable belief”
that unauthorized acquisition has occurred is enough for the
statute’s notice requirements to apply.169 Despite criticisms that
a broad trigger will increase attacks by phishers—criminals who
send fraudulent e-mails to gather the personal information of
unsuspecting individuals—it is inevitable that illegitimate
companies will try to gather consumers’ personal information in
an attempt “to exploit those who they perceive as being
vulnerable to attack.”170 Opportunistic criminals will do this
whether or not a federal data breach notification law is passed.
Therefore, such criticisms should not be a reason for blocking the
passage of a federal law.
To reduce the vagueness of California’s language, any
proposed federal statute should include factors for determining
when there is a “reasonable belief” that unauthorized acquisition
has occurred.
Although this stops short of requiring an
additional element of harm, it narrows the trigger language and
helps clarify the law. The factors presented in New York’s
statute would be a good starting point. Once again, the factors
are:
(1) indications that the information is in the physical possession
and control of an unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen
computer or other device containing information; or
(2) indications that the information has been downloaded or

168

See discussion supra Part I.B.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2010).
170
ANDREW SERWIN, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO FEDERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW § 25:2 (2010).
169
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copied; or (3) indications that the information was used by an
unauthorized person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or
instances of identity theft reported.171

However, businesses should not be in control of weighing
these factors.172 Giving businesses this power without oversight
would be tantamount to applying the business-judgment rule in a
situation where businesses clearly have an interest in selfpreservation.173 An exemption allowing entities to conduct their
own investigation to determine whether there is a “significant
risk of harm,”174 though favorable to industry lobbyists, would
likely severely decrease the number of instances in which
notification is required. Thus, consumer protection groups are
justified in their “dislike [of] trigger language that narrows
notification to occurrences where there is a reasonable belief of a
significant risk of identity theft because . . . the standard would
allow companies to notify only certain select individuals, leaving
others at risk.”175 According to the Consumer Program Director
of PIRG, “[t]he fact that the company doesn’t yet know whether
or how the information will be misused should not be enough to
excuse notice.”176
The last word on whether there is a reasonable belief of
unauthorized acquisition should be with a new federal agency
specializing in investigating security breaches rather than with
the businesses themselves.177 The FTC currently does not have
enough authority to take on this role because its jurisdiction is
limited—other federal agencies have jurisdiction over entities
such as financial institutions.178 This new agency must be
equipped with the resources and technology to make
determinations within a relatively short period of time and must

171

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(c) (McKinney 2010).
See Amant, supra note 50, at 506.
173
The business-judgment rule is the “presumption that in making business
decisions not involving direct self-interest or self-dealing, corporate directors act on
an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that their actions are in the
corporation’s best interest.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 226 (9th ed. 2009).
174
A similar exemption is present in the Senate bills. See discussion supra Part
I.B.1.
175
Lee, supra note 13, at 145.
176
Edmund Mierzwinski, Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups on Data
Security, Data Breach Notices, Privacy and Identity Theft, at 330, 340 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 8565, 2006).
177
See SERWIN, supra note 170.
178
See id.
172
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be given the power to enforce its decisions.
Otherwise,
consumers will bear the costs of not being notified until it is too
late. Adding this extra level of review will increase consumer
protection by ensuring that businesses suffering from a breach
comply with the law. Businesses will not be allowed to make
their own exceptions.
Critics arguing that the absence of a harm requirement will
lead to over-notification and unnecessary increases in the cost of
doing business presume that the benefits of over-notification do
not exceed the costs.179 In fact, the opposite is true. First,
requiring an element of harm has not been able to prevent the
public from becoming desensitized to notification letters. Junk
mail already inundates American mailboxes, and half of the
public ignores notification letters.180 It is unlikely that a federal
law will change these problems. Thus, all things being equal, a
federal law with a broad trigger will increase the number of
consumers that are aware that their information has been
compromised. Second, although some analysts argue that a
broad trigger will discourage disclosure by increasing
reputational risk,181 this problem is rectified by requiring a
federal agency to review whether there is a “reasonable belief” of
unauthorized acquisition. This agency would be able to overcome
businesses’ reluctance to comply by enforcing the federal law and
perhaps even by conducting audits of businesses’ data breach
procedures. Ultimately, a broad trigger will ensure that those
who should receive notification do receive notification, thereby
increasing disclosure, promoting knowledge, and improving
consumers’ control over their personal information.
2.

The Definition of “Personal Information”

As discussed above, there are two main issues that arise
with regard to the definition of “personal information”—
(1) whether the statute should protect only computerized data;
and (2) whether the definition of “personal information” is
sufficiently broad to protect consumers from identity theft.182
With regard to the first issue, PIRG maintains that it will not
179

See Amant, supra note 50, at 524.
See Rode, supra note 152, at 1626.
181
See, e.g., Janger & Schwartz, supra note 11 (suggesting that fear of liability
may encourage nondisclosure).
182
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
180
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support any federal law unless it covers both electronic and
paper data.183 PIRG’s request is reasonable. Because “personal
information” remains sensitive whether it is on paper or saved on
a computer hard drive, it makes no sense to protect one form of
information and not the other. Businesses are in the best
position to make sure that all the personal information they
collect is stored safely and disposed of properly. Therefore,
Massachusetts’s statute, which covers “[a]ny material upon
which written, drawn, spoken, visual, or electromagnetic
information or images are recorded or preserved, regardless of
physical form or characteristics,”184 is a good model for the federal
law to follow.
With regard to the second issue, a strict federal law must
contain a flexible definition of “personal information” to be
effective. Many types of information can lead to identity theft.
Thus, the law must be able to adapt when criminals change
targets.185 For example, an e-mail address in combination with a
mother’s maiden name, could reasonably allow a hacker to access
an individual’s personal account on various websites, including
those used for banking and insurance.186 Because a reasonable
business should conclude that the unauthorized acquisition of an
individual’s e-mail address in combination with a mother’s
maiden name could lead to identity theft, this information
should be protected by federal law. In this instance, a simple
notification letter would give consumers control over their
personal data by prompting them to change their account
passwords and their security questions. None of the federal bills
in the 111th Congress addressed this issue.
One way to keep the definition flexible is to adopt a
modified version of New York’s general definition of “personal
information.” “Personal information” should be defined as “any
information concerning a natural person which, because of name,
183

See Lee, supra note 13, at 144.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 1(a) (West 2010).
185
See Baker et al., supra note 26 (“As supply has increased and prices have
fallen, criminals have had to overhaul their processes and differentiate their
products in order to maintain profitability.”).
186
Many websites have a “forgot password?” link, allowing the user to enter an
e-mail address and “security question,” such as “what is your mother’s maiden
name,” when they have forgotten their personal password. The organization then
sends the user a new password through their e-mail address. Anyone who knows the
user’s e-mail address and the answer to the user’s security question can then gain
access to the user’s account.
184
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number, personal mark, or other identifier, can reasonably be
used to identify such natural person.”187 The law should also
enumerate types of data that are per se “personal information.”
Social security numbers, state identification card numbers,
driver’s license numbers, and account numbers along with any
necessary codes or passwords needed to access the accounts,
should all be included on this list. In addition, the new federal
agency discussed above should be given leave to add other
sensitive categories of information to this list by issuing separate
regulations.188 In this way, federal agencies, the courts, and the
legislature will be given the flexibility to adjust the definition of
“personal information” as necessary to accommodate changes in
technology and new trends in identity theft.
3.

Who Must Be Notified and When Delivery Must Be
Completed

In Part I.B.3, this Note explored how data breach
notification statutes, following California’s statute, have split
responsibilities between Owners and Maintainers.189 Any federal
data breach notification law should replicate California’s model.
California has allocated responsibilities the most efficiently by
requiring that Owners notify all residents whose personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired
by an unauthorized person, while Maintainers are only required
to inform the Owners.190
This prevents inefficiencies and
provides a clear separation of duties. The federal bills do not
meaningfully improve on this language. By overlapping the
duties of Owners and Maintainers, Congress would cause
confusion, forcing Owners and Maintainers to battle over who is
responsible for sending notification.191
In addition to requiring that notification be given to
individuals, a strict federal law should also require that
notification be given to both consumer reporting agencies and the
Attorney General. Requiring that notification be sent to both of
these entities would create a centralized place where information
on data breaches could be collected and studied. In addition, it
187
188
189
190
191

N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(1)(a) (McKinney 2010) (emphasis added).
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a)–(b) (West 2010).
See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.

CP_Tom (Do Not Delete)4/4/2011 2:11 PM

1600

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1569

would increase businesses’ compliance with the law. Recently,
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger vetoed a bill that
would have amended California’s statute to require businesses to
notify the state attorney general in the event that a breach
involved the information of more than 500 individuals.192
According to the Governor, “there is no additional consumer
benefit gained by requiring the Attorney General to become a
repository of breach notices when this measure does not require
the Attorney General to do anything with the notices.”193 Despite
the Governor’s objections, this requirement would put little
added burden on businesses and would make the attorney
general aware of possible sources of future litigation. He or she
may even want to investigate particularly egregious security
breaches in order to decide whether or not to prosecute. Because
they will want to avoid the costs of litigation, both monetary
costs and costs to their reputation, businesses faced with
increased enforcement will be more likely to disclose information
to the public in the event of a breach.
Notification should be delivered “in the most expedient time
possible and without unreasonable delay.”194 Even though this
language is vague, the bright line sixty-day deadline set forth by
the House-Senate bills195 may lead some businesses to delay
notification so that they can take advantage of the full sixty days
to either cover up the breach or investigate how best to notify
consumers. In cases of identity theft, time is of the essence. The
sooner consumers find out about the breach, the sooner they can
take measures to protect their personal information. Sixty days
is a lot of time for a person to wait if his or her name and credit
card number has been stolen. Once again, a reviewing agency
should be put in place to ensure that businesses are not delaying
notification for selfish reasons. This oversight will strengthen
and correct the vague language of the statute and increase
consumer protection.
4.

How Individuals Must Be Notified and What Information

192
Nathan Taylor & Christine E. Lyon, California Governor Vetoes Enhanced
Security Breach Notification Bill, MONDAQ, Oct. 22, 2009.
193
Id.
194
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a).
195
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Must Be Included in the Notification
Federal law should mandate that notification be made in
writing. This medium allows businesses to give consumers a
complete record of what information has been breached and
where they can go for more information. The same can be said
for notification by e-mail, but notification via e-mail opens
individuals up to phishers. Furthermore, individuals often have
numerous e-mail accounts. Often, the one that they give to
businesses is one that they use for “junk e-mail.” Therefore,
notification via e-mail should be limited to only those
circumstances in which notification in writing is not possible.
Although businesses that notify via telephone are more
likely to retain the loyalty of their customers,196 there are a
number of problems with giving notice by this method. An
automated telephone message cannot respond to consumer
questions; the affected consumer may not be home to receive the
call, causing businesses to call again and again, and there may be
too much information for the consumer to write down in a short
period of time. Furthermore, while opening another person’s
mail is a crime, there is no guarantee that the person who
answers the phone is actually the person who needs to be
notified. Thus, notification by telephone should not be permitted.
In addition, “substitute notification” should be an option in
situations where there is no way to contact the individual or
individuals involved. The Senate bills’ failure to provide for
substitute notification is a serious oversight because businesses
left with no way to contact consumers would not be required to
send notification by other means. Businesses that cannot contact
the affected individuals should be required to notify state media
or place a “conspicuous” posting on their websites. This will
heighten the statute’s “ ‘invisible hand’ effect,” whereby “each
business independently looks after its own interests by imposing
the level of security it believes necessary to insulate itself from
liability.”197 The media can always be used as a weapon against a
business’s reputation.

196

See Rode, supra note 152, at 1629.
Id. at 1629–30; see also Raymond T. Nimmer, Security Breach Notice Laws:
Evidence?, CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, LICENSING & INFORMATION
LAW (Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.ipinfoblog.com/archives/privacy-data-protection-andsecurity-35-security-breach-notice-laws-evidence.html.
197
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Businesses that use personalized letters are also more likely
retain the loyalty of their customers;198 thus, states were smart to
specify what information must be disclosed to consumers in the
event of a breach.199 At minimum, consumers should be told:
(1) what information has been breached; (2) how they can
monitor their personal information; and (3) who they can contact
to obtain more information. Current laws that do not require
specific disclosure open the door for abuse of the law. Businesses
that do not want to spend time updating their procedures to
collect the information necessary for proper notification will give
consumers little to no information regarding the breach, reducing
consumers’ ability to protect their own personal information.
Specific disclosure decreases consumers’ animosity and increases
consumers’ ability to control their personal information because
consumers that know what information has been acquired have a
better chance at noticing the signs of identity theft and
mitigating future damages.
5.

The Penalties for Failing To Notify Affected Individuals

Any federal data breach notification statute should allow for
a private right of action. Fear of litigation is a strong factor in
persuading businesses to comply.200 Major data breaches lead to
lawsuits, which settle even where there is no proof of negligence
or harm.201 These lawsuits can cost companies a lot of money in
attorney fees, settlement agreements, and lost business. Thus it
makes sense to allow lawsuits based on a failure to notify,
regardless of the likelihood that such cases will succeed.
Businesses will be encouraged to disclose or face the possibility of
having to pay out significant sums of money, motivating them to
take preventative measures by increasing investment in
improved technology and security programs.
CONCLUSION
A uniform data breach notification law that preempts the
forty-six state laws currently in place would end many of the
difficulties faced by businesses engaged in interstate commerce,
while increasing consumers’ control over their own personal
198
199
200
201

See Rode, supra note 152, at 1629.
See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
Picanso, supra note 153, at 373.
Danzig et al., supra note 1, at 61.
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information. The law enacted must be strict. It must increase
the chances that businesses will disclose information to the
public in the most expedient time possible in the event of a
breach. A federal data breach notification statute with language
that provides for an acquisition based trigger, a broad definition
of personal information and a private right of action will
strengthen the incentives for businesses to invest in security and
implement improved data protection procedures. Furthermore, a
federal agency should be put in charge of overseeing businesses’
determinations regarding whether a security breach has taken
place and when notification is required. The media, the U.S.
Attorney General, and the new federal agency should all play a
role in enforcing the law. Residents of Alabama, Kentucky, New
Mexico, and South Dakota should no longer have to wait for their
states to provide them with the same protections that other
residents of the United States currently enjoy. Until Congress
passes a federal data breach notification law, consumers in the
United States will remain unprotected, while businesses bear the
costs of a complicated state statutory scheme.

